



Abstract: The paper examines Empedocles’ attributions of immortality. I argue
that Empedocles does not withhold immortality from the gods but rather has an
unorthodox conception of what immortality is. Immortality does not mean, or
imply, endless duration. A god’s immortality is its continuity, as one and the
same organism, over a long but finite period. This conception of divine immor-
tality then influences Empedocles’ other attributions of immortality, each of
which marks a contrast with discontinuity, real or apparent. The nature of this
contrast varies from context to context, and there is considerable heterogeneity
in the list of immortal items. On the other hand, the attribution of immortality
never implies that the item is completely changeless.
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Empedocles identifies himself as a daimôn (B115) and elsewhere as a god (B112),
but his account of the cosmic cycle suggests that daimones and gods, or at least
some gods, do not last forever. Despite claiming to have attained godhood he
does not believe that his existence will continue endlessly into the future. It is
natural to contrast Empedocles’ eschatology with the account of the soul that
Socrates eventually vindicates in Plato’s Phaedo,1 according to which the soul
will never perish, whatever else may befall it. How is the contrast between
Empedocles and Plato best expressed? We may find it natural to say that
Empedoclean gods, unlike Platonic souls, are “mortal”, not “immortal”. But
this does not correspond to the attributions of “immortality” in Empedocles’
poetry. I will argue in this paper that Empedocles is not withholding immortality
from the gods, but offering a different, and in retrospect non-Platonic, concep-
tion of what it means to be immortal. My approach will be to start with the items
*Corresponding author: Alex Long, School of Classics, University of St Andrews, KY16 9AL,
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1 Plato has put forward for consideration other views of the soul, such as Cebes’ suggestion that
the soul is ultimately perishable but more durable than the body (86e6-88b8). In this paper I
focus on the contrast between Platonic and Empedoclean conceptions of immortality, a contrast
suggested already by O’Brien (1995, 452). For discussion of the later Platonist interpretation of
Empedocles see O’Brien 1995, 407–8 and 458–65.
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that are described as immortal and to consider in each case what their immor-
tality involves, rather than to assume from the outset what immortality ought to
mean.
It may seem incredible that an immortal item could fail to be endlessly long-
lived. The immortal gods of Homer and Hesiod are described as αἰὲν ἐόντες (e. g.
Hesiod Theogony 21, 105), and accordingly we would expect Empedocles to
attribute immortality to items that will persist endlessly into the future. That
expectation is encouraged by Hippolytus, according to whom (RH 7.29.10)
Empedocles viewed as “immortal” Love and Strife, both of which, as
Empedocles’ own words (B16) show, will always exist (and indeed are ungener-
ated). But ungenerated gods are not the only gods in Empedocles’ theology.
Empedocles says that some gods came to be: they arose or “sprouted up” from
the elements (e. g. B21.10-12), at least in some cases from a previous mode of
existence as human beings (B146). There is an obvious problem if these gener-
ated gods persist for ever: as they are generated during part of an endlessly
repeated cycle, their persistence into all subsequent cycles would entail an
infinite proliferation of gods. (This assumes not that each cycle is exactly
identical to each of the others, but merely that some gods are generated each
time.)2 But there is no threat of divine overpopulation: “all things” come
together in the reign of Love (B17.4 and 7). The generated gods, like the “god”
(B31) Sphere, do not last forever.
We would thus expect these gods to be described as “mortal”, and the
description of generated gods as having long lives (B21.12, B23.8, a (ii) 2) is
often taken to imply precisely that point: they are long-living, but nonetheless
mortal.3 But according to Empedocles the gods are immortal. Here is a list of the
items said to be “immortal” in the surviving verses:4
(1) Empedocles himself (ἄμβροτος, B112)
(2) the gods and (perhaps) the former humans who join them (ἀθάνατος,
B147)5
2 Trépanier 2003a discusses exact repetition between cycles.
3 See Wright 1995, 273; Barnes 1982, 501–2; Sedley 1998, 9 n.43; Trépanier 2004, 86, 2010, 305
and 2014, 175; Rangos 2012, 317 and 318 n.8. For the “mortality” of the Sphere see Kirk et al.
1983, 296. Empedocles seems to have coined “long-living”, δολιχαίων, and so the term demands
special comment. See p.16 below.
4 I believe that ἄμβροτος and ἀθάνατος must be equivalent, for otherwise Empedocles’ self-
description ἄμβροτος, οὐκέτι θνητός (B112.4) would be poorly worded. All the same, I indicate
in parentheses which term is applied to each of the items on the list. For ἄμβροτος as
“immortal” in Homeric Greek see Buttmann 1861, 80.
5 The former humans become ἀθανάτοις ἄλλοισιν ὁμέστιοι, and, as Inwood observes (2001, 57),
ἄλλος need not imply that the former humans share the property of immortality. See LSJ s.v.
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(3) Calliope, Empedocles’ Muse (ἄμβροτος, B131.1)
(4) cosmic objects made of air, said to be “drenched in light” (ἄμβροτος, B21.4)
(5) the onset of Love (ἄμβροτος, B35.13)
(6) items that became immortal and then, during Love’s onset, became mortal
(ἀθάνατος, B35.14)
Later in the paper I will try to identify the more obscure items, (4) and (6). The
absences from the list are no less striking than the inclusions. Despite
Hippolytus’ testimony, Love and Strife are not said to be immortal; it is rather
than the “onset” (ὁρμή) of Love that is immortal, and Love’s onset will6 not
endure endlessly. Eventually the Sphere will be formed, and later still Strife will
push back. Nor does her onset go back infinitely far into the past; at some point
she started bringing things together. We might suppose that “immortal” in
Φιλότητος ἀμεμφέος ἄμβροτος ὁρμή has been transferred and, strictly speaking,
applies to Love herself.7 That is possible but unnecessary, for, as I hope to show,
a process of finite duration can be understood as “immortal”, once we make
sense of Empedocles’ use of that word elsewhere. If we are determined to find
Love on the list of immortals then Calliope is the only other candidate, but,
given Empedocles’ robustly pluralist theogony (see e. g. B122), that identification
is far from certain.8 There is surprisingly little evidence that Empedocles ever
attributed immortality to items of infinite duration, and strong cumulative
evidence that he attributed it to items of finite duration.
As one would expect, it has been suggested that Empedocles is merely
“speaking loosely” when he uses the word “immortal”.9 Behind that suggestion
lies an assumption that “immortal”, if intended seriously, must refer to some-
thing unending. Empedocles’ attributions of immortality would then have to be
explained away in order to distinguish his eschatology from those, such as
Plato’s, that promise an endless future.10 But some other evidence in
Empedocles suggests a different explanation: he and Plato do not have the
II 8. For fuller discussion see O’Brien 1995, 446–8, which finds the most “natural” reading to be
that the former humans too are immortal.
6 The tenses of these verbs are relative to the time described in B35.13; I do not refer to the
stage of the cycle in which Empedocles places himself and his contemporaries.
7 So Wright 1995, 208. Wright provides no parallels, but see B27.2 (αἴης λάσιον μένος).
8 For Empedocles’ “theogony” see Porphyry Abst. 2.21. Empedocles’ “theogony” may of course
have been far shorter than Hesiod’s, but otherwise there is little to support Wright’s scepticism
about an Empedoclean theogony (1995, 282–3).
9 Barnes 1982, 502.
10 “Personal immortality is not, in fact, explicitly promised in Empedocles’ eschatology”
(Barnes 1982, 502).
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same conception of immortality. The most decisive passage is Empedocles’ claim
that immortality can be gained and then lost: “what had previously learned to
be immortal grew to be mortal immediately” (B35.14). Something can be immor-
tal without being immortal forever.11 We can add that he warns his reader not to
expect “birth” and “death” to be used in their usual sense: people call “birth” or
“coming to be” (γενέσθαι) the arrival, in the air, of the combined constituents of
a man, animal or plant, and they call “ill-fated death” (δυσδαίμονα πότμον) the
separation of the constituents (B9; compare B8 and B11). These appellations are
not “right” (θέμις), but Empedocles says that he will follow the convention
(I take it, by using the terms “birth”, “death” and related words).12 The fact
that he censures the ordinary usage of “death” should shake any confidence that
he must be using “immortal” in its ordinary sense.
My approach in the paper will be to examine the items called “immortal”
and those with which they are contrasted. In most occurrences of “immortal”,
there is an explicit contrast between “immortal” and some other term: “mortal”
(B35.13-14, B112.4), “ephemeral” (B131), “human” or “belonging to men” (B147).
The single exception is B21, where Empedocles speaks of “immortals” composed
of air and does not explicitly contrast them with something else, although I will
suggest that these “immortals” are contrasted with the appearance that they
give to human observers.
As we have just seen, B35 indicates that it is possible, at least for some
items, to gain, or “learn”, and then lose immortality. It is less clear how much
importance to attach to his choice of the verb “learned” (35.14). Empedocles
elsewhere describes the elements “learning” to become one (B26.8, a verse also
inserted by Diels as the ninth line of B17), and it is not certain that he has in
mind a genuinely cognitive transformation. And while the humans who achieve
immortality, such as Empedocles, are undoubtedly learned, they become immor-
tal on the strength of their benefits to other people (in religion, medicine,
leadership and poetry) not merely their learning (B146). “Learned” in B35.14
probably means little more than “became”.
One final preliminary point is that the problem I am addressing is not the
familiar one of relating Empedocles’ “religious” thought to his physics. Some
11 See O’Brien 1995, 449; Wright 1995, 292; Rangos 2012, 333. B112.4 (“immortal god, no longer
mortal”) confirms that an item can be immortal without always having been immortal; compare
“learned to be immortal” in B35, and contrast the Platonic theory of an essentially immortal soul
in the Phaedo and Phaedrus.
12 If θέμις really was in Empedocles’ text (see Wright 1995, 177), he may be referring not merely
to his denial of total destruction (and generation from nothing), but also to the impiety of
blaming a daimôn for one’s mortality. As B115 suggests, the daimôn responsible is none other
than the mortal himself.
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scholars would say that the above list of six “immortal” items combines verses
from different poems, and so it might be thought that the problem derives from
artificially juxtaposing religious and scientific doctrines.13 But even if we confine
ourselves to the passages most at home in an On Nature – that is, the descrip-
tions of immortals (4), (5) and (6) above – a puzzle remains. Immortality can be
gained and then lost (B35), and bodies of air (B21) are called “immortal”: what
does this mean?
Sky and Moon (B21)
I begin with Empedocles’ discussion of large cosmic bodies, which almost
certainly has a theological dimension, given the many connections between
his poem and Hesiod.14 Later in the paper I will consider Empedocles’ account
of the daimôn’s punishment (B115) and its relationship with the account in
Hesiod of the coma and isolation of a perjured deity (Theogony 783-804). At
this point I will outline one aspect of the relationship between Empedocles and
Hesiodic theology. Empedocles’ gods are generated, as we have seen, but with-
out sexual intercourse. Xenophanes had criticized others for supposing that the
gods are born or “fathered” (γεννᾶσθαι, B14). It is not certain whether
Xenophanes intended to deny that the gods come to be at all or, more specifi-
cally, from parents.15 Empedocles took Xenophanes’ side, or what he probably
took to be Xenophanes’ side, against Hesiod, and denied that gods are generated
sexually. Whereas in Hesiod’s Theogony sexual intercourse is the central cause
of new divine life, to such an extent that the exceptions are often noted (e. g.
Theogony 132, 213) in Empedocles’ theogony sexuality does not feature, and even
in his zoogony it is given a severely restricted explanatory role. Humans and
other animals may reproduce sexually now, but this is only one of several forms
of generation (Aetius 5.19.5, A72).16 New gods continue to emerge, but not from
parents; rather, they “sprout up” from humans (ἀναβλαστοῦσι, B146.3).17 One
13 I find the two-poem hypothesis more plausible (see p.16 below), but it should be obvious
that I am trying to find an interpretation of “immortality” that takes into account all the
fragments.
14 See for example Most 2007, 284–92; Koning 2010, 210–17.
15 Lesher 1992, 86–8 assumes that generation of any kind is denied – as did Aristotle (Rhetoric
1399b6–8).
16 See Sedley 2007, 40–1.
17 Empedocles uses vegetative language when needs an alternative to sexual generation. In
B21.10-12 βλαστάνειν is used first of trees, which is not surprising, but then of other organisms,
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consequence, surely intended by Empedocles, of this further generative stage is
that the humans who have attained immortality become, as gods, parentless.
Empedocles even says explicitly that two gods, Sphere and “immense, holy
intelligence”, do not have sexual organs (B29, B134).18 Sphere’s successor (the
next Sphere) will be generated by Love, but, again, not sexually. Many gods are
generated, but no god has a parent, or is a parent, in the literal sense.19 So much
for the elaborate family tree of Hesiod’s Theogony.
As is often observed, Hesiod’s deities include the largest parts of the physi-
cal world. Earth, sky, sea, sun and moon are gods and members of the divine
family (Theogony 126-32, 371-4). What is the status of these huge cosmic bodies
in Empedocles’ system? (I call them “cosmic” bodies or masses in order to
distinguish them from the huge elemental masses that are formed, on one
interpretation, during the acosmic reign of Strife.) Given his responses to
Hesiod, such as the response outlined above, it is hard to believe that
Empedocles did not see a question about the largest cosmic bodies as, at least
in part, a theological question. It is well known that Empedocles applied the
names of gods to the four elements or roots (B6), but it does not follow from this
that he did not also regard as a god the large cosmic conglomeration of an
element. In B38 he gives a divine name, “Titan”, to one such cosmic mass (either
the sun or the sky),20 and in B42 he applies to the moon Athena’s epithet
including gods, men, women and animals. A verb conveying asexual generation is appropriate
throughout the passage, as it concerns the relationship between organisms and the elements,
not an organism and its parents. See also βλαστάνειν in B57, where the organisms are not yet
capable of sexual reproduction, and ὅρπηξ in B62.
18 Given the similarities between their descriptions, it is tempting to identify the intelligence
with the Sphere (as in Primavesi 2008, 258), but for arguments against the identification see
Santaniello 2012, 310. Notice the strange combination of genders in Sphairos (B27.3, 28.2), a
feminine noun with a masculine ending. Perhaps such a combination seemed more effective
than a neuter to mark completeness without a particular sex.
19 This is in keeping with Empedocles’ views on marriage and sexual (or at least heterosexual)
intercourse (Hippolytus RH 7.29.22, 7.30.4). Compare the speculations recorded at Aulus Gellius
4.11.9-10, which may or may not be based on intelligent reading of Empedocles.
20 In B38 “Titan” is usually taken as a name of the αἰθήρ, but Kingsley 1995a argues that “Titan”
is a separate object, the sun. Unfortunately the name “Titan” could be used intelligently both of
the sun and of the sky. If it names the sun Empedocles may be referring to the Titan Hyperion (as
in e. g. Odyssey 1.24, one of the parallels cited by Kingsley). If it names the sky, on the other hand,
there may be a connection between Hesiod’s etymology of “Titans” (“they stretched or exerted
themselves”, Theogony 207-10), and Empedocles’ choice of “Titan” as the name of the vastly
extended body that surrounds the world. One further question is whether the sky is identical to
the “Olympus” of B44 (on which see Kingsley 1994, 323); in my discussion of B21.4 and its airy
immortals I give pride of place to B38 for the reason that there the sky is explicitly said to be
composed of air. For Empedocles’ use of αἰθήρ for “air” see Kingsley 1995b, ch. 2.
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γλαυκῶπις. It is easy to assume that any mention of “sun” in Empedocles is
merely a reference to the element fire (and so on for earth, sea or rain, and sky).
But this is only sometimes the case. For example, in B98 (the composition of
blood and flesh) “rain” must stand for “water”, as Simplicius notes.21 By con-
trast, in B38 “sea” really is the sea: Empedocles is promising to explain how the
sun, earth (the Earth, not the element), sea and sky all came to be. Elsewhere
(B41) he says that the sun was “assembled” (presumably from fire; cf. A49) –
and of course he cannot mean that fire was assembled from fire.
In Empedocles’ theology, as in Hesiod’s, being generated is consistent with
being a god. But in Empedocles’ system the cosmic conglomerations come to an
end. In B27 he describes a period (the reign of Strife, according to Plutarch, fac.
lun. 926d) when the sun, earth and sea do not exist, and another period (that of
the Sphere, according to Eudemus)22 when the sun no longer exists. And yet in
B21.4 some cosmic bodies, composed of air (the three other elements are repre-
sented in 21.3-6) are called “immortal”:
ἀλλ’ ἄγε, τῶνδ’ ὀάρων προτέρων ἐπιμάρτυρα δέρκευ,
εἴ τι καὶ ἐν προτέροισι λιπόξυλον ἔπλετο μορφῆ,
ἠέλιον μὲν λευκὸν ὁρᾶν καὶ θερμὸν ἁπάντηι,
ἄμβροτα δ’ ὅσσ’ εἴδει23 τε καὶ ἀργέτι δεύεται αὐγῇ,
ὄμβρον δ’ ἐν πᾶσι δνοφόεντά τε ῥιγαλέον τε·
ἐκ δ’ αἴης προρέουσι θελεμνά τε καὶ στερεωπά.
Come, look upon the witnesses to that previous account, should its form have been at all
lacking: the sun, bright to see and hot all over; all the immortals (ἄμβροτα) that are
drenched in heat and shining light; the rain, dark and cold in everything; and from the
earth pour things rooted and solid. (B.21.1-6)
This has obviously discomfited translators and commentators. Wright 1995
translates ἄμβροτα not “immortal” but “heavenly”, and in Kirk, Raven and
Schofield24 it is suggested that ἄμβροτα are the “breezes and expanses of air”
that supply ambrosia to the sun; ἄμβροτα would then point to their role as
nutrients and not (as we would certainly expect) to immortality.
In B21 Empedocles is trying to support a claim about the elements, namely
that even though there are only four of them they jointly constitute the obser-
vable world. In support of this he calls upon visible or tangible “witnesses”
(21.1-6). The witnesses testify to the contrasting qualities of the elements.
Empedocles obviously associates the witnesses very closely with the elements,
21 Simplicius in Phys. 32.3-4.
22 See Simplicius in Phys. 1183.27-8.
23 For the emendation εἴδει see Bollack 1965-9, vol. 3, 112.
24 1983, 294.
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for after the description of the witnesses he describes, without marking a con-
trast, how the elements come together, fall apart and constitute divine and non-
divine organisms (21.7-14). But there is nonetheless a distinction between wit-
ness and element,25 shown above all in the sixth line of the fragment, where the
“witness” is not the element earth but the solid objects that come forth in
abundance from the Earth. And the witnesses testify by means of their own
qualities. For example, the sun shows the brightness and heat of the element fire
because it is itself so obviously bright and hot. So we should not suppose that
the qualities predicated of the “witnesses” are true of the elements and are not
true of the witnesses themselves.26 The sun is hot, the rain is dark and cold –
and the airy “witnesses” are themselves immortal.
What are these witnesses, and why are they called “immortal”? They are
said not to be bright or dark but to be “drenched” in light (and perhaps in heat).
This suggests a more subtle contrast between air and fire than between fire and
water. The sun shows the ability of fire to heat and illuminate, rain shows the
darkness and coldness of water, and the ἄμβροτα show the ability of air not to
generate light (and maybe heat), but to be illuminated (and maybe warmed) by
something else. (Compare the “drenched” altar of B128.8, which is made wet and
bloody not by itself but by the sacrifice.) These airy bodies do not emit light of
their own, and so cannot include stars, but they are illuminated, and so cannot
include breezes.27 The moon, which is made of air (A30, A60) and gets its light
from the sun (B43, B45, B47), is the obvious match. Given that he uses the plural
ἄμβροτα, there must be at least one other illuminated immortal, and this is most
likely the sky (B38), another illuminated body consisting of air.28
The nature of their immortality is, to our eyes, quite simple, but to
Empedocles it must have seemed pioneering. He draws on Parmenides’ discov-
ery about the moon and the source of its – or “its” – light (Parmenides B14, B15),
25 Simplicius is thus misleading when he says that in this passage Empedocles is simply using
“sun” as a word for “fire”, “rain” for “water” and so on (in Phys. 159.10-12).
26 Contrast Bollack 1965-9, vol. 3, 112.
27 Contrast Wright 1995, 178 (moon and stars), and Kirk et al. 1983, 294 (“probably breezes and
expanses of air”).
28 For a quite different approach see Picot 2014, where B21 is connected with the names of
deities, particularly Hera, at B6. Picot argues that in Homeric Greek ἄμβροτος refers to items
that are not immortal but are merely associated with an immortal (2014, 369). But it is not
certain that an item associated with an immortal cannot itself be immortal (compare Buttmann
1861, 80), and in any case Homeric usage should not be emphasized at the expense of
Empedocles’ own usage, particularly if Empedocles is putting forward a new and non-
Homeric view of immortality. When Empedocles uses ἄμβροτος of himself (B112.4) he is not
claiming merely to be associated with an immortal; he himself is no longer mortal but a god.
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and extends it to the sky. The sky is illuminated at some times and at others is
not;29 the moon appears to lose and then regain large segments of itself, and in
eclipses it disappears entirely. But in fact both sky and moon are not destroyed
or diminished. There is thus a contrast between, on the one hand, the appear-
ance of diminution or destruction and, on the other, the persisting reality.
ἄμβροτος gets its meaning through this contrast: these bodies persist and,
despite the appearance of destruction and diminution, do not really undergo
those changes.
Empedocles can thus explain why, and in what sense, two of Hesiod’s
deities, sky and the moon, are immortals. But he does not suggest, as Hesiod
would certainly suggest, that these “immortals” will last forever. And during
their existence Empedocles’ “immortals” may, despite their immortality,
undergo changes, such as the moon’s locomotion (B45). ἄμβροτος points
not to complete changelessness, but to the absence of specific changes
during the item’s existence. Similarly in other fragments, as we will see,
immortals are not totally changeless, but changeless in some specific
respect.30
Love and the Former Immortals (B35)
αἶψα δὲ θνήτ’ ἐφύοντο, τὰ πρὶν μάθον ἀθάνατ’ εἶναι,
ζωρά τε τὰ πρὶν ἄκρητα διαλλάξαντα κελεύθους.
τῶν δέ τε μισγομένων χεῖτ’ ἔθνεα μυρία θνητῶν
παντοίαις ἰδέῃσιν ἀρηρότα, θαῦμα ἰδέσθαι.
What had previously learned to be immortal grew to be mortal immediately, and those that
were unmixed before became mixed, having exchanged paths. As they mixed tens of
thousands of races of mortals poured forth, fitted with forms of every kind, a wonder to
behold. (B35.14-17)
Here Empedocles describes how mortality contributes to new life. Two
groups of mortals are mentioned. By being mixed, some previously immortal
items become mortal, and through that process other mortals, of staggering
29 At B48 Empedocles states the explanation: the earth is interposed between the sun and the
stretch of sky above the observer. Aetius 2.20.13 (A56) suggests a very different picture, in which
there is one celestial hemisphere full of fire, another containing fire and air. Kingsley 1994
argues persuasively that this attribution is incorrect and explains how such a view came to be
attributed to Empedocles.
30 Contrast O’Brien 1969, 59, where it is suggested that the “immortal” objects of B35.14 are
changeless.
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number and variety, are generated. The second group of mortals owe their lives
to the newly gained mortality of the first group. Members of the second group
are said to belong to countless “races” (35.16; compare 35.7), and so must be
living organisms, although it is not agreed whether they are the organisms of
Empedocles’ own day or some other period. It is difficult to discuss this passage
without taking a stand on some central questions about Empedocles’ cosmology.
In what follows I take no view on whether or not the organisms generated at the
end of B35 are Empedocles’ contemporaries. But I do assume that whereas Love
brings together portions of different elements, Strife brings together portions of
the same element; I also assume that “mixture” refers exclusively to Love’s
activity, not Strife’s.31
In the present context the key question concerns the nature and identity of
the first group of mortals (B35.14), those that used to be immortal. The
standard identification is with the elements or roots.32 That may seem the
only possible reading, given that their mortality is connected to mixture. But
here it is vital to distinguish between (1) an element, (2) a particular mass or
body composed exclusively of a single element, and (3) the portions of the
element that compose a single-element body. When setting the scene for the
loss of immortality Empedocles says that Strife has withdrawn partly but not
fully from the world, and still “restrains” some portions of the elements (35.8-
11).33 That is, Strife prevents some portions from being mixed with other
elements. But some other portions are now mixed. So at this time not every
portion of, say, fire is in the same condition; “many” portions of fire are not
mixed with other elements, but mixed portions of fire exist simultaneously
(35.8). Given that there already exist mixed portions of the elements, the
unmixed items of line 15–that is, the items that so far have been immortal –
cannot be the “elements” without some further specification. Rather, they must
be the unmixed portions of each element, the constituents of one-element
bodies, i. e. (3) in the list above. All that we are told about those unmixed
portions is that they are “many” (line 8). The bodies constituted by them must
therefore be either large or numerous (or both), and so far as I can see nothing
31 See for example Inwood 2001, 49–55; Trépanier 2003b, 35. Some importance evidence is
what Inwood calls (50) “the creative power of strife”, shown by the two painters of B23. That
suggests that Strife does not merely fragment; it sorts. I do not have space here to address
properly the innovative interpretation of the cycle in Sedley 2007.
32 “Il (l’Amour) force les éléments à quitter leur divinité” (Bollack 1965-9, vol. 3, 204). See also
O’Brien 1969, 59; Long 1974, 410 n.15; Wright 1995, 208; Primavesi 2006, 68; Trépanier 2010,
303.
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in B35 helps us choose between these interpretations.34 If the world described
in 35.8-11 at least resembles the world inhabited by Empedocles and his
contemporaries, then the single-element bodies include vast masses, such as
the sun, moon, sea and sky. Imagining those bodies combining to produce
new organisms would certainly inspire the awe professed by Empedocles
in 35.17.
The contrast between “immortal” and “mortal” in 35.14 is between the
contrasting conditions of one and the same portion of an element. First, together
with other portions of the same element, it belonged, as an “immortal”, to a
single-element body; then, under the influence of Love, it is mixed and becomes
a constituent of a “mortal”. Henceforth the portion will be recycled in a succes-
sion of living compounds, and at this point it itself becomes a mortal – as
Empedocles says, it changes “path” (35.15). “Immortality” thus marks the con-
dition of the portion when it belonged to a specific, single-element body, by
contrast with a sequence of mortal compounds; what it lost, when it is mixed
with other elements, is a kind of continuity. There is a controversy about how far
down the new discontinuity goes: when the elements are combined, it is not
certain whether each of the combined elements retain its distinctive qualities.35
But the following should be uncontroversial: at least part of the new disconti-
nuity will be the secondary, or derivative, properties for which the elemental
portions become responsible. The portions of a single-element body give rise to
a specific and unchanging group of properties, such as warmth and solidity; in
that regard they do not change, even though a single-element body and its
portions may still experience other changes, such as (again) locomotion. By
contrast, when they become portions of living mortals they, in combination with
other elemental portions, give rise to diverse properties: the characteristics and
parts of different organisms. If “immortal” marks a kind of continuity, not
endless duration or complete changelessness, we can understand why the
onset of Love through the world should itself be called “immortal” (35.13).
Love’s expansion is a continuous and uniform process. It will end, and during
its existence it affects more and more portions of the elements, but as long as it
exists it promotes mixture.
If the “immortals” of B35.14 are previously unmixed portions of an element,
does he ever indicate whether or not the elements themselves are immortal?36
34 I am grateful to Brad Inwood for discussion of this point.
35 For recent discussion see Ierodiakonou 2005, 6; Palmer 2009, 279–317.
36 According to Hippolytus the four elements are not immortal but mortal, as they die and are
revived (RH 7.29.10-11, 7.29.23; compare B26.2). See Inwood 2001, 31–2. Hippolytus may have in
mind B35; if so, he is wrong to associate their dying with Strife rather than Love.
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The closest he comes to answering that question is in his discussion of the
elements’ changes and permanence (B26.8-12; cf. B17.9-13). There he suggests
that it depends on one’s perspective. If one looks to the regularity of the
elements’ changes, then, as he says, “they are always changeless in the cycle’:
the elements come together, are separated and so on without end. But if one
asks ‘are the elements divided or integrated?”, the only answer is that they
constantly change. In this regard they have no “firm life” (17.11, 26.10). The
implication is that neither “mortal” nor “immortal” is fully appropriate.
Empedocles and Other Gods
In B112 Empedocles announces to his fellow-citizens that he is an “immortal
god, no longer mortal”, echoing solemn self-revelations of deities in epic.37 It
has been argued – mistakenly, in my view – that Empedocles does not really
commit himself to the self-description. Empedocles says that he is an immortal
god ὑμῖν (112.4) and that he is honoured ὥσπερ ἔοικα (112.5); his wording in
these two lines has been taken to show that he is merely telling the people of
Acragas how they perceive him.38 As has long been recognized,39 however, ὑμῖν
is merely an “ethical” dative; any translation risks overtranslating, and nothing
stronger than Wright’s “I tell you” is needed. A Homeric parallel (Odyssey
22.348) shows that ὥσπερ ἔοικα points to what the speaker deserves, not to
how he is perceived by the addressee, and anyway in the Empedoclean passage
ὥσπερ ἔοικα should be taken with “honoured”, not “immortal”. The meaning is
that Empedocles is honoured by all, and appropriately. In recent scholarship it
has also been suggested that the large number of the addressees (the inhabitants
of Acragas) shows the passage and, perhaps, the Katharmoi more generally, to
be “exoteric”.40 Without some specification of what it means to be exoteric –
accessible or guarded, vague or actually misleading – this does not tell us much
about Empedocles’ immortality. And if we want to explain the large number of
addressees in B112 there is a credible alternative to exotericism. As I have
observed already, in B146 Empedocles suggests that immortality is achieved
by benefactors: leaders, poets, prophets or doctors, or those who, like
Empedocles himself, combine these different roles. So it is hardly surprising
37 Iliad 24.260; Odyssey 20.47.
38 Trépanier 2004, 84; 2010, 304.
39 See Panagiotou 1983 and Zuntz 1971, 189-90. As Zuntz asks, why would the inhabitants of
Acragas need to be told how they perceive Empedocles?
40 See Primavesi 2001, 2008, 268. Compare Kingsley 1995b, 366.
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that when proclaiming his own immortality he puts himself in a relation not
with an individual but with an entire city, and then shows how, as a religious
authority and doctor, he has benefited cities on a vast scale.
The contrast in this fragment is between the mortal and immortal
Empedocles. In order to understand the contrast we need to understand
Empedocles’ mortality, and the passage where he describes that is his self-
identification with one of the daimones who become “all the forms of mortals”
(B115.7).41 When a daimôn is punished with mortality, the duration of its exis-
tence is not curtailed. Instead it loses uninterrupted existence as a particular
kind of organism (the best kind, a deity). Much of Empedocles’ description of the
cause, nature and end of the punishment echoes or responds to Hesiod.42 For
example, in Hesiod’s Theogony perjured deities are denied the food of the
immortals until their punishment is over (796-7, 802-4), and similarly
Empedocles says that those who gain immortality join the company and
“table” of the immortals (B147). (The divine feast is even made to seem more
relevant in Empedocles’ poem, given that food brought about, and can prolong,
the deity’s exile.)43 Less conventional is his emphasis on change and disruption
as a form of punishment.44 The punished daimôn “exchanges the harsh paths of
life” (115.8), and must keep migrating between the regions of air, sea, earth and
sun (115.9-13). Transmigration thus takes it not merely between organisms, as
Empedocles reveals elsewhere (B117), but between elemental environments.
At least in Empedocles’ version, transmigration is not supposed to offer
consolation. On the contrary, Empedocles is trying to surpass Hesiod in severity.
Whereas the punished deity in Hesiod returns to the other gods in the tenth year,
Empedocles’ daimôn is banished for thirty thousand “seasons” (probably ten
thousand years),45 and is banished repeatedly. The unhappy deity is shunned
and ejected from wherever it tries to make its home (sea, earth, air or the rays of
the sun). We might compare B15, where Empedocles implies that a mortal, or
what is formed as a mortal, continues to exist after death (he says that a wise
man would not suppose otherwise). This is not intended to be an entirely
encouraging message, for the view he rejects is that goods and evils are confined
41 See also B113, where he says that “mortal” human beings are “destroyed” many times. A
mortal must survive one “destruction” only to face yet another one, and then another one after
that. Here too mortality is connected not with brief, or finitely long, existence but with
transmigration.
42 See Kirk et al. 1983, 317; Most 2007, 286-91.
43 See B115.3 and B139.
44 But here too there is a verbal echo of Hesiod, as Most 2007 has shown. See ἄλλος δ’ ἐξ
ἄλλου δέχεται in B115.12 and Theogony 800.
45 See O’Brien 1969, 85-92; Primavesi 2001, 27.
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to what is called life (15.3). By denying annihilation at death Empedocles risks
elevating all human beings to the status of immortals, and an attraction of
transmigration is that it restores a sharp distinction between immortals and
mortals – as long as “immortality” is reserved for those who have escaped
transmigration. Survival is guaranteed, but it will involve further suffering,
and little continuity, for all those who have not attained immortality. Godhood
brings not total changelessness (the god of B134.5 thinks rapidly), but, once
again, continuity of a more specific kind.
Empedocles is frustratingly unforthcoming about how much the daimôn
retains from one life to the next, but that may indicate that, until the achieve-
ment of immortality, very little is retained. All that is certain is that it must retain
its guilt, again until it regains immortality, for it continues to be punished up to
that point. It might be argued that the daimones, or some of them, must be able
to recollect previous lives, but the evidence for this is not as strong as one would
expect. When Empedocles lists his previous forms of life (B117), the list high-
lights the contrasts between his previous lives (he has been female as well as
male, a bird, a fish and even a plant), and so his claims may be based not on
recollection (or on what he took to be recollection) but on an inference from his
theory that any daimôn is punished with contrasting modes of life.46
Empedocles’ attitude to Pythagoras is therefore complicated. When
Empedocles praises an anonymous man of exceptionally broad knowledge
(B129), he was taken by some ancient readers to be speaking of Pythagoras.47
Empedocles says that the man had knowledge ranging over ten or twenty life-
times, but he does not say that the man’s knowledge came from personal
recollection. Instead, as scholars have noted, in the little he says about the
basis of the man’s knowledge – “he had the greatest wealth of understanding” –
he echoes his description of the knowledge to which Pausanias should aspire.48
46 Compare Wright 1995, 59. At B118 Empedocles says that he wept and wailed on seeing an
“unfamiliar place”, which might be thought to imply that he remembers previous modes of
existence. But we do not know what he means by the “unfamiliar place” – or the identity of the
more familiar place with which it is contrasted. One credible possibility is that he is describing
his reaction as a newly born baby, used to the womb, to the chilly air outside it: according to
Clement (Strom. 3.14.1) Empedocles was in this passage disparaging γένεσις. Compare the
similar wording in the report of Epicurean doctrine at Sextus Empiricus M 11.96.
47 For the identification of the man with Pythagoras see Porphyry (vit. Pyth. 30) and Iamblichus
(vit. Pyth. 67). According to a different view (Diogenes Laertius 8.54) Empedocles was referring
to Parmenides. As Lloyd observes (2014, 30 n.10), the disagreement suggests that Empedocles
himself left obscure the identity of the man, at least in the part of the passage still available to
some later readers.
48 See Macris and Skarsouli 2012. With πραπίδων πλοῦτος (B129.2) compare θείων πραπίδων
πλοῦτος (B132) and ἀδινῆισιν ὑπὸ πραπίδεσσιν (B110).
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Moreover, the man is said to have known not merely the details of his own
previous lives but far more than that: “each of all things” over a huge period. We
are reading a description of an outstanding polymath. On the other hand, this
does not show that the ancient identification of the man with Pythagoras was
incorrect. Empedocles may be reinterpreting Pythagoras’ knowledge in such a
way as to accommodate anecdotes about Pythagoras49 without implying that the
daimôn can actually recollect previous lives. Pythagoras simply knew more than
anyone else, and so, when asked, could “see” previous events as if he had been
there.50
As we have seen, when the daimôn becomes one “mortal” after another, its
longevity is unaffected, if longevity means merely length of existence. But it is
no longer one and the same kind of organism throughout its existence: it is
through this discontinuity, as well as banishment from the company of the gods,
that the daimôn is punished. By contrast, achieving immortality as a god is not
only to return to the gods but to regain continuity, psychological and bodily,
over a long but ultimately finite period. This will involve some kind of transition:
as Empedocles says, reaching for an alternative to sexual reproduction, a select
few “sprout up” as gods (B146). But Empedocles may expect, as a god, to retain
his current knowledge and memories, and so in that regard immortality is
already his.
When addressing his “immortal” Muse Calliope Empedocles contrasts her
with someone “ephemeral” (B131.1). The goddess is contrasted either with a poet
who was previously assisted by her, or with the addressee of such a poet.51 In a
recent paper Most suggests that Empedocles has in mind Hesiod, who singles
out Calliope at Theogony 79, but it is easier to understand her interest in “our
concerns” (131.2) if the reference is to either Empedocles or Pausanias.52
49 For the story of Pythagoras and his former life as Euphorbus see Heraclides of Pontus
(reported in Diogenes Laertius 8.4-5), Lucian Dialogues of the Dead 6.3, Philostratus Life of
Apollonius 3.19, Hippolytus RH 1.3.
50 The passage may thus respond to Heraclitus B40. Pythagoras’ knowledge had a practical
application (129.3), no doubt in purification above all, and so being a polymath had indeed
given him understanding.
51 ἐφημερίων τινος could of course be neuter, but see Zuntz 1971, 212. A contrast between a
Muse and an ephemeral person is more natural than one between a Muse and an ephemeral
poem or subject matter. The fragment as quoted by Hippolytus (RH 7.30.4) is incomplete in line
2, and Zuntz argues (211-13) that an entire line has been omitted after line 2.
52 Most 2007, 291-2 (Hesiod); Zuntz 1971, 213 (Pausanias). Most’s explanation of “our concerns”
is that Empedocles connects himself with Hesiod as “members of the same professional guild”.
Empedocles’ opposition to divine sexuality makes it unlikely that, when aiming to write piously
about the gods (B134.4), he would connect himself with Hesiod and even suggest that Hesiod
had divine assistance.
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“Ephemeral” and the contrast with “immortal” suggest that the reference must
be to Pausanias, not Empedocles, but that is certain only if Empedocles has
“immortal” status throughout the fragments. So far I have tried to avoid the
question of the number of Empedocles’ poems, but as it happens Empedocles’
comments on his own mortality and immortality constitute some of the evidence
for his having written at least two poems, not one. In B112, the opening of the
Katharmoi,53 Empedocles says that he is a god, no longer mortal, whereas in
B115 he is an exile from the gods, doomed as a daimôn to become different
mortals. How can he both be “no longer mortal” and continue to become “all
forms of mortals”? The simplest explanation is that B115 derives from an earlier
poem where he still saw himself as a mortal.54 As the Strasbourg papyrus has
shown,55 Empedocles did not write with a clean separation between religious
and cosmological questions; this is evidence neither for nor against a two-poem
hypothesis, but it does show that the subject matter of B115 no longer requires us
to place it in the same poem as other fragments with a “religious” theme.
We must finally return to the description, in three passages, of the gods as
“long-living” (B21.12, B23.8, a (ii) 2). These gods do not last forever, but if, on the
strength of that, we call them “mortal” we are deviating from Empedocles’ own
choice of words elsewhere. In each of the passages where gods are called “long-
living” they are said in the same line to be “pre-eminent in honours” (“pre-
eminent” must be supplied to complete the line in the Strasbourg papyrus).
Given that context, it is most unlikely that “long-living” is intended to show
what the gods lack.56 Empedocles frequently connects the shortness of life to
ignorance or error: in their lives people see only a small portion of life (B2.3),
and the Muse of long memory is contrasted with the “ephemeral” creatures who
will listen to her (B3.4). B11 suggests a connection between the short time people
have for reflection and the short duration that they, mistakenly, attribute to
things (in both cases, from birth to death and no further). Their thoughts are
doubly οὐ δολιχόφρονες. In drawing attention to the gods’ longevity – that is,
53 Diogenes Laertius 8.54.
54 See Kahn 1974, 452; Sedley 1998, 10. For defence of the one-poem hypothesis, and discus-
sion of the key evidence at Diogenes Laertius 8.77, see Trépanier 2004, ch.1; for arguments in
favour of allocating B115 to the Katharmoi see O’Brien 2001. It is true that, as O’Brien observes,
Hippolytus mentions the Katharmoi shortly after quoting B115 (RH 7.30.3-4; 7.29.14-25) – among
other fragments. But the fact that Hippolytus names the Katharmoi there shows at most that it
contained the prohibitions mentioned in 7.30.3-4.
55 See e. g. Janko 2005, 2; Primavesi 2008, 267.
56 Compare εἰκὼς μῦθος in Plato’s Timaeus, the negative connotations of which have long been
overemphasized. See above all Bryan 2012, ch.3, but also Burnyeat 2005.
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their longevity as a specific organism – Empedocles is showing the gods’ most
important advantage, in cognitive terms, over humans.
This gives us the best clue as to why Empedocles’ uses of “immortal” are so
heterogeneous and, to our eyes, strange. Despite their finite duration Empedocles
wants to retain “immortal” as an honorific for his gods, and as an honorific the
term should accurately mark what gives the gods an advantage, particularly an
epistemic advantage, over other creatures. A long or even infinitely long exis-
tence would be of no benefit to gods if they did not also enjoy continuity as a
specific organism, for this continuity is necessary if they are to have full access to
their vast stock of previously acquired experiences. “Immortal” should thus be
used of the gods’ freedom from disrupting “deaths” during their long existence.
This then controls how “immortal” is applied to further items, even though these
other items have widely different functions, effects and qualities that, for as long
as they are immortal, are not interrupted. But, as I have tried to show, the
Hesiodic context of his poetry makes it less surprising that he applied his new
conception of “immortality” to vast cosmic bodies.
Conclusion
Empedocles uses “immortal” when making various contrasts, and denying
various changes, and in conclusion I consider what the immortal items have
in common. Empedocles sometimes associates death with mixture or separation
(B9, B17.4), and this encourages the thought that immortal items are unmixed or
undivided, by contrast with some item that is mixed or divided. We have seen
this in the case of the illuminated objects of air, which despite appearances
retain their physical integrity, and the “immortal” portions of B35, which lose
their immortality when they are mixed with portions of other elements. But
elsewhere mixture and division, at least of this kind, have not been as prominent
as one would expect. In his discussion of the punished daimôn (B115) he talks of
separation from the gods, where the daimôn is not divided but isolated from
others. Empedocles must believe that transmigration involves physical mixture
of some kind, given that human, animal and plant life start with mixture (B9),
but the details of this are notoriously left vague.57 Such “mixture” as there is in
B115 is the new compulsion on the daimôn to inhabit different environments.
Empedocles saw continuity, over a long but finite time, as the more impor-
tant common feature, for it is concerning this that we find a verbal echo between
passages. His discussions of both daimones and elemental portions suggest that
57 For a recent account see Trépanier 2014.
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for long as something is immortal it does not “change paths” (B35.15 and
B115.8), even though it may change in other respects. Of course, what it
means not to “change paths” will vary from case to case. An immortal god
remains one and the same organism, and, unlike a transmigrating daimôn,
retains the memories and understanding acquired over its long life as that
organism. Celestial objects perceived by means of “borrowed” light (B45) retain
the size and shape that they appear to lose. Unmixed portions of an element give
rise to the same set of properties until they are mixed with other elements – the
“mortality” caused invariably by the “immortal” expansion of Love.
Does immortality have a common cause or origin? We might find it natural to
associate immortality with Love, particularly as the daimôn loses its immortality
from placing its trust in Strife (B115.14), but in fact Love is not the only cause of
immortality, and sometimes causes the opposite: in B35 Strife causes portions of
elements to become immortal, and Love is then responsible for their mortality.
The common feature of the immortals’ origins is rather that in each case the origin
is asexual. The celestial objects, for example, are created when portions of an
element come together. Apotheosis is represented as quasi-vegetative generation,
and so the awkward fact that the human being had parents can be discounted.
Empedocles aims to keep immortality pure from sexuality; Hesiod is his principal
target, but this is also one of the main differences between Empedocles and Plato.
By comparison with Empedocles, Plato’s discussions of immortality are more
accommodating to sexuality and human reproduction. Unlike Empedocles,
Plato sees no reason to deny immortality to a soul that is still transmigrating,
but in Plato a soul that has merely finite duration would not be immortal.
Conventions used and acknowledgments: Throughout the paper I use upper-
case letters (A and B) to refer to the reports and fragments in Diels and Kranz
1951; a lower-case letter in bold (a) refers to the Strasbourg papyrus (Martin and
Primavesi 1998; Janko 2005). My thanks to those with whom I have discussed the
interpretation outlined above, particularly Brad Inwood and Simon Trépanier.
Most of the work was undertaken in Toronto during a Leverhulme Research
Fellowship; I am very grateful to the members of Toronto’s CPAMP, particularly
Martin Pickavé, and to the Leverhulme Trust.
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